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THE "BETTER READING" OF SECTION 17 OF THE
INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: A REJECTION OF
AUTOMATIC WAIVER OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN MEMPHIS BIOFUELS
Sarah W Conkright+
"Business more than any other occupation is a continual dealing with the
future; it is a continual calculation, an instinctive exercise in foresight."' Few
contexts require as much foresight as dealings between tribal and nontribal
2businesses.
Generally, tribal corporations resemble nontribal corporations with respect
to their business sophistication and legal savvy;3 tribal corporations, however,
carry an added shield of tribal sovereign immunity.4  In the absence of
congressional abrogation or tribal waiver, sovereign immunity insulates a tribe
from suit.s
The historical roots of tribal sovereign immunity stem from numerous court
decisions recognizing tribal nations as sovereign powers. A tribe may choose
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2012, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2006, University of Virginia. The author would like to thank those who provided feedback,
insight, and recommendations throughout the writing process, as well as the members of the
Catholic University Law Review who diligently and thoughtfully worked on the production of this
article. She would also like to thank her family and friends for their continual support and
encouragement.
1. THE FORBES BOOK OF BUSINESS QUOTATIONS: 10,000 THOUGHTS ON THE BUSINESS
OF LIFE 110 (Ted Goodman ed., Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers 2006) (1997) (quoting Henry
R. Luce).
2. For purposes of this article, a "nontribal" corporation includes entities formed pursuant
to state corporate statutes, rather than tribal law or federal Indian law.
3. See KAREN J. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN M. NILLES, TRIBAL BUSINESS STRUCTURE
HANDBOOK Ill-12 (2008) (demonstrating how the structure, management, and operation of a
section 17 tribal corporation parallels nontribal corporations).
4. See, e.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) (noting
that tribes retain immunity from contract suits, which include commercial disputes); see also
Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 S.D. L. REV. 398, 416
(2009) ("Tribal sovereign immunity from suit is broad in scope, applies to tribal commercial
activities conducted both on and off the reservation, [and] extends to conduct of tribal entities that
operate as extensions of the tribal government .... ).
5. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 283 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 354-55, 357-58 (1919) (describing the
Creek Nation as "a sovereign people; having a tribal organization, their own system of laws, and
a government with the usual branches"); see also COHEN, supra note 5, at 122 (emphasizing the
inherent power of tribal nations).
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to waive its sovereign immunity, but must do so clearly and expressly.7
Absent such an explicit waiver, a court will not find that a tribe has abrogated
its sovereign immunity. Thus, if a nontribal corporation enters into a business
agreement with a tribal corporation and fails to include express provisions
requiring the tribal corporation to waive either partial or full immunity, then
the nontribal corporation could find itself without legal recourse in the event of
a breach.9
In a commercial context, parties seeking judicial recourse in response to a
tribal entity's contract breach or tortious act may be barred from pursuing their
claim because U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over such disputes as a result of
tribal sovereign immunity.' 0 Some courts, however, have determined that if a
corporate charter or contract contains a "sue and be sued" provision or
arbitration clause, then the tribal corporation has expressly waived its
immunity." Such clauses denote a tribe's conscious effort to expose itself to
liability so that it may participate competitively with nontribal corporations in
the corporate world.'
Because sovereign immunity may create legal barriers for nontribal
corporations and place tribal corporations at a disadvantage in business
dealings, the argument for an automatic waiver of immunity for incorporated
tribes has arisen. 13  In application, such a rule would allow nontribal
corporations to remove all barriers preventing future legal action against tribal
corporations, thus enabling nontribal corporations to protect themselves from
an unexpected invocation of immunity. 14
7. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (quoting United States v.
Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976)).
8. See id. at 59.
9. See Gene Barton, Waiving Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Arbitration Agreements
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the King County Bar Association), available at
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/53184478/Tribal-Sovereign-Immunity-Can-Pose-Business-Barrier
(stressing the importance of sovereign-immunity waiver provisions in contracts with tribal
corporations).
10. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754, 759-60 (1998).
11. See C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S.
411, 414 (2001); Veeder v. Omaha Tribe ofNeb., 864 F. Supp. 889, 901 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
12. Recent Case, Sovereign Immunity-Indian Tribal Sovereignt-Tribes Not Immune from
Suits Arising from Off-Reservation Business Activity-Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M 174,
754 P.2d 845 (1988), 102 HARV. L. REV. 556, 561 (1988) (explaining how tribes may be
motivated to adopt such a clause because sovereign immunity often places tribal corporations at a
commercial disadvantage).
13. See Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Alaska
1978) (noting that Congress recognized the reluctance of nontribal businesses to contract with
tribal corporations due to their sovereign immunity and sought to remedy this disadvantage by
authorizing section 17 tribal corporations, which have the ability to waive immunity).
14. Cf Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country's Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the
Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 599-600 (2010) (stating that nontribal
entities may be "unpleasantly surprised" to learn that the tribe with whom they are transacting
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To promote competition and tribal self-govemance, secure Native American
rights, and encourage economic development, Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934. Section 17 of the IRA created a provision
for federal tribal incorporation.1 Congress intended this section to restore
economic prosperity to tribes' 7 and to encourage tribes to conduct business
transactions with nontribal corporations.18
In Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc., the
plaintiff argued that incorporation under the IRA should automatically divest a
tribal corporation of sovereign immunity. 19 The Sixth Circuit rejected this
argument, and despite acknowledging a split in authority on the issue,20 held
that incorporation under the statute did not automatically waive a tribal
corporation's immunity.21
Part I of this Note examines the development of tribal sovereign immunity,
including section 17 of the IRA, prior case law, and various instances where
courts have found that federally incorporated tribal corporations have waived
sovereign immunity. Part II examines in detail Memphis Biofuels, and
specifically focuses on the Sixth Circuit's rejection of section 17 incorporation
as an automatic waiver of immunity. Part III analyzes the court's holding in
light of the split in authority to determine whether the Memphis Biofuels
holding comports with prior jurisprudence. This analysis considers the
legislative purpose of the IRA, the underlying principles of sovereignty, and
the implications of a contrary holding. Taking these factors into consideration,
Part IV concludes that, given the importance of congressional deference, the
weakness of contrary case law, and the potential negative impact of a contrary
holding, the Sixth Circuit made an appropriate finding.
business possesses immunity from suit, especially when no outward indicators of this immunity
existed).
15. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494a (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 73-1804, at 1 (1934).
16. See 25 U.S.C. § 477. Under section 17, tribes may petition the Department of the
Interior for a federal charter to create distinct tribal corporations. Id.; see also Parker Drilling
Co., 451 F. Supp. at 1131 (noting that section 17 of the IRA permits tribes to create a "separate
and distinct Indian corporation").
17. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6.
18. S. REP. No. 73-1080, at 1 (1934) (stating that one of the purposes of the legislation was
to "permit Indian Tribes to equip themselves with the devices of modem business organization,
through forming themselves into business corporations").
19. 585 F.3d 917, 920 (6th Cir. 2009). The plaintiff also argued that the tribe had both
expressly waived immunity and waived immunity based on equitable doctrines. Id at
921-22. The court rejected both of these arguments. Id.
20. Id. at 920. The court recognized that the Northern District of Iowa had found that "a
Section 17 corporation waives sovereign immunity." Id. (quoting GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe
of Neb., 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1188-89 (N.D. Iowa 1994)). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit had
rejected the idea that incorporation leads to an automatic waiver. Id (citing Am. Vantage Cos. v.
Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002)).
21. Id.at920-21.
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1. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT, AND
SECTION 17 CORPORATIONS
A. Early Characterizations of Tribal Sovereignty
Fundamentally, the powers vested in Indian tribes are the "inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished." 22 The concept of
tribal sovereignty developed during the European conquest of the Western
Hemisphere, the founding of the United States, and the subsequent judicial
interpretations regarding the powers of Indian tribes.23
Before the European conquest of the Western Hemisphere, Indian tribes
remained complete] sovereign-free to govern their own affairs as
independent nations. The influx of Western settlers gradually eroded this
sovereignty as conquering nations asserted superior claims to land titles under
the discovery doctrine.25 Additionally, treaties between tribes and the United
26States ceded tribal lands to Western settlers. During the early nineteenth
century, removal policies also forced tribes to relocate farther west, allowing
white settlers to take over their lands.27 The General Allotment Act of 1887
led to further exploitation by permitting the fragmentation of tribal land as part
of an overall assimilation policy.2 8 Although these policies stripped Indian
22. COHEN, supra note 5, at 122.
23. See BRYAN H. WILDENTHAL, NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY ON TRIAL 6-10 (2003)
(providing an overview of tribal sovereign immunity, from the conquest of the Native Americans
through the enactment of the Constitution and Justice Marshall's opinions in the Cherokee
Cases).
24. Id. at 5-6; see WILLIAM C. CANBY JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 115
(5th ed. 2009) ("When Europeans first established colonies in America, they had little choice but
to deal with the Indian tribes as the independent nations that they were.").
25. See Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823). Justice Marshall
explained the discovery doctrine:
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the
private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice
of the claim which has been successfully asserted. The British government, which was
then our government, and whose rights have passed to the United States, asserted a title
to all the lands occupied by Indians, within the chartered limits of the British colonies.
It asserted also a limited sovereignty over them, and the exclusive right of
extinguishing the title which occupancy gave to them.
Id. at 588.
26. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 51-53. Such treaties commonly included boundary
provisions that conceded particular tracts of land to the United States, but also guaranteed tribes
the right to fish and hunt on the ceded land. CANBY, supra note 24, at 115.
27. COHEN, supra note 5, at 53-54.
28. See Eric C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A Critical
Reexamination of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV. 107, 130-31
(2008).
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tribes of their land and self-governance, tribes still possess limited sovereign
powers today.29
The Constitution supports the idea that tribes have inherent sovereign
characteristics. 30 The Commerce Clause likens the relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes to that of foreign nations and individual
states.3 1 Similarly, the President's treaty power contains an implicit
understanding that the United States makes treaties with sovereign nations.32
Presumably, then, because the United States has entered into several treaties
with Indian tribes,33 tribes must have retained some elements of inherent
sovereipnty. 34 Moreover, despite a series of cases limiting the power of Indian
tribes, the Supreme Court has held that Indian tribes are separate and distinct
nations with sovereign powers, and are not subject to the laws of state
36governments.
29. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) ("Indian tribes still possess those
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status.").
30. WILDENTHAL, supra note 23, at 7 (noting that language in the Constitution could be
interpreted as an implicit recognition of tribal sovereignty).
31. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes"); WILDENTHAL,
supra note 23, at 7.
32. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur."); Sovereign Immunity: Oversight Hearing to Provide for Indian Legal Reform Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) [hereinafter Committee Hearing] (statement of
Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, V. Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) ("Our Constitution makes
clear that treaties are the documents which express the legal relationships between
sovereigns . . . .").
33. See CANBY, supra note 24, at 115-21 (discussing treaties made between Indians tribes
and the United States).
34. See id. at 119 (explaining that treaties between the United States and Indian tribes are
given the same force of law as treaties between the United States and foreign nations).
35. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (holding that the
Cherokee Nation was not fully independent nation, but rather a "domestic dependent nation,"
which had a ward and guardian-type relationship with the United States); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603-05 (1823) (finding that Indians were entitled to possess their land, but
could only sell it to the U.S. government because they did not actually hold title to the land they
occupied).
36. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-57 (1832). But see White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 & n.9 (1980) (noting that the Court had "long ago"
abandoned Worcester's bright-line prohibition). The Worcester Court noted that treaties between
the United States and Indian tribes that regulate commerce exhibit the United States' recognition
that tribes are politically independent entities with sole authority over their land. Worcester, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57.
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B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity as a Shield from Suit
Against the historical backdrop in which the United States viewed Indian
tribes as "distinct political communities" and thus sovereign nations,37 the
Supreme Court first articulated the concept of tribal immunity in Turner v.
United States.38  The Court held that the Creek Nation, as a sovereign, had
immunity from suit for damages sustained to property the tribe had leased to
the plaintiff.39  Secondly, the Court found that absent congressional
authorization, the tribe could not be "sued in any court; at least without its
consent."40  This secondary holding became the bedrock for future court
decisions regarding tribal immunity.
In United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Supreme
Court voided a lower court's decision that granted recovery against a tribe.42
Relying on the language in Turner, the Court found that tribes were immune
from suit, absent congressional authorization.43
Building upon this precedent, the Supreme Court later determined that a
tribe does not waive sovereign immunity merely by seeking certain types of
relief." In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Oklahoma, the tribe filed a motion for injunctive relief to prevent the
state from collecting a sales tax from a tribal store.45 The Court held that only
Congress maintained the authority to limit tribal immunity and determined that
Congress had not done so with regard to the collection of tax assessments. 46
Thus, in accordance with the holding in United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., the Court found that the tribe did not waive sovereign immunity simply
because it sought injunctive relief.47
37. Id
38. Turnerv. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919).
39. Id at 357-58 (recognizing the Creek Nation's political autonomy and power over its
internal matters, but noting that sovereign immunity did not create the primary barrier to the
plaintiffs recovery in this case).
40. Id. at 358.
41. See Clay Smith, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A Primer, ADVOCATE, May 2007, at 19-20
(2007) (discussing how tribal sovereign immunity derives from Turner's secondary holding).
42. United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
43. Id. The Court reiterated that "[c]onsent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a
sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise ofjudicial power is void." Id. at 514. But
see Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1977) (explaining that tribal
immunity does not insulate individual tribal members from legal proceedings in localities where
they are subject to personal jurisdiction).
44. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
509-10 (1991).
45. Id. at 507.
46. Id at 510.
47. Id. at 509-10. Despite this finding, the Court ultimately ruled that although the state
could not tax cigarettes sold to tribe members, the State could collect taxes from sales to non-tribe
members. Id. at 512 ("[T]ribal sovereign immunity . . .does not excuse a tribe from all
obligations to assist in the collection of validly imposed state sales taxes.").
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Most recently, Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc. required the Court to determine whether tribes may be sued in state court
for off-reservation commercial activities.48 Although the Supreme Court
described the development of tribal immunity as accidental49 and enumerated
policy arguments against continued adherence to the doctrine,so the Court
decided to maintain deference to Congress. 5  Because Congress had not
abrogated immunity and the petitioner had not waived it, the Court found that
it lacked authority to revisit the doctrine.52
Turner, Oklahoma Tax Commission, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
and Kiowa each recognized that the authority to waive tribal immunity lies
only with Congress or the tribe itself.53 To abrogate tribal immunity, Congress
48. Kiowa Tribe of Olka. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
49. Id at 756. Although the Court itself often cited Turner as the basis for tribal immunity,
the majority declared that Turner did not actually establish such a proposition. Id. Instead, the
Kiowa Court asserted that the Turner Court had merely assumed immunity without providing a
reasoned analysis. Id at 757. However, the Kiowa Court did recognize that its later holding in
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. explicitly adopted the propositions made in Turner. Id
50. Id. at 758. The majority acknowledged that tribal immunity "extends beyond what is
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance" to commercial tribal activity. Id. The Court noted
that this wide scope could present issues for those who contract with a tribe and are unaware of
the tribe's immunity. Id.
51. Id. at 758-59 (declining to narrow tribal immunity for commercial activities to those
activities that occur entirely on reservations).
52. Id at 760; see also Andrea M. Scielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal
Sovereign Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 680 (2002) (noting
that the Kiowa Court recognized valid arguments in favor of abrogating tribal immunity but
refused to impose limitations despite having done so in other instances); Christopher W. Day,
Note, Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.: Doing the Right Thing for All the Wrong
Reasons, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 279, 327-28 (1999) (observing that the Kiowa Court expressed a
desire for Congress to narrow tribal immunity). Following the Kiowa decision, Senate hearings
on the proposed Indian Equal Justice Act revisited the issue of tribal sovereign immunity, and
both sides of the issue were debated vigorously. Compare Committee Hearing, supra note 32, at
5 (statement of Sen. Slade Gorton) ("This bill asks no more and no less than that Indian tribes be
subjected to the same degree of responsibilities as others are."), with id at 3 (statement of Sen.
Daniel K. Inouye, V. Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian Affairs) ("[This bill] would divest the Indian
nations of their governmental status and relegate them to the status of individuals or private
corporations for the purpose of legal actions in State and Federal Courts.").
53. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 754; Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian
Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506,
512 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919). Congressional consent to sue must
be express and unequivocal, and cannot be implied; tribes may waive immunity provided that
they adhere to the same requirements. See, e.g., Ramey Constr. Co. v. Apache Tribe of the
Mescalero Reservation, 673 F.2d 315, 318 (10th Cir. 1982) (stating that an affirmative waiver by
Congress or the tribe is necessary to abrogate sovereign immunity); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Indians;
Native Americans § 10 (2005) (noting that a tribe must expressly waive sovereign immunity).
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must demonstrate an "unequivocal expression" of legislative intent.54 Absent
such express language, a court cannot infer waiver.55
C. The Purposes of the Indian Reorganization Act
Following the forced assimilation and land allotment policies of the
56nineteenth century, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to improve the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.57  The IRA,
also known as the Wheeler-Howard Act, sought to restore Indian tribes to a
position of self-governance, and is considered the single most important
statute affecting Native Americans since its passage over seventy-five years
ago. 59 After revisions and extensive hearings, Congress passed the IRA in
1934 with President Roosevelt's full endorsement. 60
Congressional reports and debates detail the legislative intent behind the
IRA.61 For example, the House Committee on Indian Affairs Report described
54. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) ("In the absence . . . of any
unequivocal expression of contrary legislative intent, we conclude that suits against the tribe
under the [statute] are barred by its sovereign immunity from suit."); see also Am. Indian Agric.
Credit Consortium, Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting the district court's finding that immunity could be waived by implication).
55. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976)) (explaining that Congress's expansive power to permit waiver constrains a court's ability
to find implicit waivers of immunity).
56. See ELMER R. RUsCO, A FATEFUL TIME: THE BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN REORGANIZATION ACT 2 (2000); WILDENTHAL, supra note 23, at
52-53. Professor Bryan H. Wildenthal characterizes "the period from about 1870 to 1930 [as] the
all-time low point for Native American sovereignty." WILDENTHAL, supra note 23, at 53.
During this period, the federal government undertook efforts to assimilate the Indian population
as part of a policy designed to terminate the existence of independent tribal governments. Id. at
25-26. For example, the Allotment Act of 1887 divided tribal land and allotted plots to
individual Indians, while subjecting the rest of the land to non-Indian exploitation, ultimately
leading to a significant reduction in tribal lands and resources. Id.
57. See WILDENTHAL, supra note 23, at 30 (noting that the Roosevelt administration
"marked an epochal shift in federal Indian policy").
58. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494a (2006); 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (1934). Tribal
self-governance encapsulates the conservation of tribal resources, creation of an independent
credit system, procurement of higher education opportunities, and formation of businesses. S.
REP. NO. 73-1080, at 1 (1934); see also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152
(1973) (detailing the legislative intent underlying the IRA).
59. RUSCO, supra note 56, at ix; see also 78 CONG. REC. 11,125 ("[T]he IRA is the greatest
step forward the [Government] has ever taken with reference to Indians."). This statement
encompasses the related statutes that extend the IRA to other tribes, such as the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act of 1936 (OIWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1936).
60. See S. REP. NO. 73-1080, at 3-4 (including a letter from President Roosevelt who
encouraged the passage the act because it would "allow[] the Indian people to take an active and
responsible part in the solution of their own problems").
61. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 1 (1934) (indicating that the House Committee on
Indian Affairs advocated for the bill because it promoted "local self-government and economic
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the Act as a tool to enable effective land use and responsible management of
business affairs, as well as a means "to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life
and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of
oppression and patemalism."62  IRA proponents viewed the legislation as a
way to promote tribal authority over tribal affairs through programs that would
allow "increasing numbers of Indians to enter the white world on a footing of
equal competition."63
Section 17 of the IRA permits the Secretary of the Interior to issue a
corporate charter to any tribe that petitions for one and whose tribal governing
64
body subsequently ratifies the charter. Hence, tribal corporations chartered
under this statute are known as section 17 corporations.65 By authoring this
provision, Congress intended to enable economic business development and
promote tribal engagement in commercial markets.66 Incorporation under the
IRA creates a business that is "wholly owned by the . . . tribe, but [that
enterprise," among other objectives); S. REP. No. 73-1080, at 3 (explaining that the IRA would
improve the overall welfare of Native Americans).
62. H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6.
Reduced to its simplest terms, the present bill would prevent any further loss of Indian
lands, would permit the purchase of additional lands for landless Indians, would set up
a modem system of Indian agricultural and industrial credit, would permit Indian tribes
or groups to incorporate for business purposes, would give Indian tribes the right to
organize tribal councils for the promotion of the common welfare, would establish a
special Indian civil service and give to qualified Indians the preference right to
appointment in the Indian Service, and would create a loan fund for the vocational and
professional training of Indians in order to qualify them for the Indian Service and for
other employment.
78 CONG. REC. 11,727.
63. 78 CONG. REC. 11,732. Despite this early optimism, scholars debate whether the IRA
has achieved its goal. See RUSCO, supra note 56, at ix; WILDENTHAL, supra note 23, at 284
(noting that some have criticized the Act as overly intrusive).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006). The statute states:
Such charter may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, take by gift,
or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, operate, and dispose of property of every
description, real and personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian lands
and to issue in exchange therefore[e] interests in corporate property, and such further
powers as may be incidental to the conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with
law; but no authority shall be granted to sell, mortgage, or lease for a period exceeding
twenty-five years any trust or restricted lands included in the limits of the reservation.
Any charter so issued shall not be revoked or surrendered except by Act of Congress.
Id.
65. Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 918 (6th Cir.
2009).
66. 73 CONG. REC. 11,731 ("The enactment of this legislation will permit a continuous and
increasing exercise of civic power and cooperative action by the Indian peoples, and it will set the
entire Indian population in motion . . . ."); see also Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian
Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1141 (D. Alaska 1978) (indicating that Congress intended section 17
to place tribal organizations on the same footing as nontribal corporations).
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operates as] an entity separate and distinct from the [Indian] Nation.
Although maintaining tribal immunity has its advantages, it can put an
69
enterprise at a competitive disadvantage. Thus, section 17 corporations may
choose to waive their immunity so they can remain commercially
-70
competitive.
A tribe may also elect to organize under section 16 of the IRA, which creates
an organization notably different from section 17 corporations. While section
17 allows incorporation under a federal corporate charter,n7 section 16 permits
tribes to organize as federally-recognized tribal governmental entities. Some
courts have found these two entities to be lepally distinct,73 which becomes
important when examining the tribe's actions.
D. Judicial Findings of Waiver in Tribal Corporations
1. "Sue and be Sued" Clauses
The distinction between section 16 and section 17 incorporation becomes
relevant in the context of "sue and be sued" clauses. 75 These clauses purport to
waive a party's immunity, thereby making it amenable to suit.76 The Supreme
Court has held that a "sue and be sued" clause in its "normal connotation
67. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 918; see also Parker Drilling, 451 F. Supp. at 1131
(recognizing section 17 corporations as distinct entities); Atkinson v. Haldane, 569 P.2d 151, 174
(Alaska 1977) (referring to section 17 businesses as "distinct legal entities" and noting that "[t]he
legislative history of the Indian Reorganization Act also supports a determination of
separateness").
68. Atkinson, 569 P.2d at 174 (recognizing that the protection of a tribe's few and precious
resources may necessitate tribal immunity).
69. Id. Tribes may consider waiving immunity to prevent broad congressional or judicial
waiver, to facilitate business dealings with parties concerned about the lack of judicial recourse,
and to conform to general principles of fairness. Amelia A. Fogleman, Sovereign Immunity of
Indian Tribes: A Proposal for Statutory Waiver for Tribal Businesses, 79 VA. L. REV. 1345,
1354-55 (1993).
70. See Parker Drilling, 451 F. Supp. at 1131.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2006).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (providing tribes with the authority to adopt a constitution, bylaws, and
hold special elections while retaining their "inherent sovereign power"); see also Separability of
Tribal Organizations, 65 Interior Dec. 483 (1958) (request for interpretive opinion) (identifying
the diverse purposes and functions of sections 16 and 17 of the IRA).
73. See, e.g., Veeder v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 864 F. Supp. 889, 898 (N.D. Iowa 1994);
GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe ofNeb., 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (N.D. Iowa 1994).
74. See Veeder, 864 F. Supp. at 900; GNS, 866 F. Supp. at 1188-89; see also infra note 81
and accompanying text (discussing the implications of a tribe contracting in its section 16
capacity versus its section 17 capacity).
75. See Smith, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that the effectiveness of a "sue and be sued"
clause may depend on whether the tribe was acting in its governmental or corporate capacity).
76. See Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245-46 (1940) (finding that Congress's
inclusion of a "sue and be sued" clause in the formation of a federal agency effectively waived
the agency's sovereign immunity).
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embrace[s] all civil process[es] incident to the commencement or continuance
of legal proceedings."77 In federal legislation, these clauses effectively waive
the federal government's sovereign immunity.78 In terms of tribal immunity,
courts also generally recognize that such clauses constitute a waiver.79 This is
not a blanket rule, however, and certain limitations exist.so
If a tribe enters into an agreement in its section 16 governmental capacity,
then an express waiver of immunity via a "sue and be sued" clause may not
subject the tribe to suit. However, if a plaintiff can establish the presence of
a "sue and be sued" clause, and also demonstrate that the tribe was acting in its
section 17 corporate capacity, courts will generally hold that the clause
constitutes a waiver of immunity. 82  For instance, in Parker Drilling Co. v.
Metlakatla Indian Community, the court found that "[b]y granting the power to
sue and be sued the [section 17] corporation has attempted to waive generally
its sovereign immunity."83 The court noted that such a general waiver permits
courts to entertain breach-of-contract actions as well as tort claims against
tribes. 84
77. Id. at 245 (finding that "when Congress launche[s] a governmental agency into the
commercial world and endow[s] it with authority to 'sue or be sued,' [it creates an] agency [that]
is not less amenable to judicial process than a private enterprise under like circumstances would
be"; thus the clause should be construed narrowly unless Congress has plainly stated otherwise).
7 8. Id.
79. See, e.g., Fontenlle v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 430 F.2d 143, 147 (8th Cir. 1970); Md.
Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1966); Parker Drilling Co. v.
Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D. Alaska 1978).
80. See supra note 75.
81. See Veeder v. Omaha Tribe of Neb., 864 F. Supp. 889, 900-01 (N.D. Iowa 1994)
(dismissing the case for failure to properly identify the entity being sued, but noting that if the
plaintiff had clearly sued the tribe under its section 17 capacity, as opposed to section 16, then the
court would have found a waiver of immunity via the "sue and be sued" clause in the tribe's
charter). If a tribe "mixes its use of governmental and corporate powers," however, the presence
of a "sue and be sued" clause may indicate a waiver of sovereign immunity. Dacotah Properties-
Richfield, Inc. v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 520 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
82. See, e.g., Fontenelle, 430 F.2d at 147; Parker Drilling, 451 F. Supp. at 1136-37;
Brunette v. Dann, 417 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (D. Idaho 1976); Martinez v. S. Ute Tribe, 374 P.2d
691, 694 (Colo. 1962).
83. 451 F. Supp. at 1137. Notably, "sue and be sued" provisions only expose the tribal
corporation's corporate assets to suit-not the assets of the tribal nation. Note, In Defense of
Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1058, 1060-61 (1982) (explaining that, regardless
of a tribal corporation's "sue and be sued" clause, tribal funds and "tribal assets such as land and
minerals remain protected"); see also ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 3, at 111-15 (noting that
incorporation under section 17 protects a tribe's government assets).
84. Parker Drilling, 451 F. Supp. at 1137 (citing Atkinson v. Haldene, 569 P.2d 151,
172-75 (Alaska 1977)) (recognizing that "[t]he purpose of § 17 was to allow Indians to enter into
business transactions on an equal footing" with nontribal corporations, and thus rejecting any
limitation to tort liability). The court also noted that "it is unlikely that a prospective customer
would feel comfortable entering a business office or using a corporate product if the corporation
were immune from tort liability. Only with the potential for imposition of tort liability are Indian
corporations truly equal . . . ." Id.
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However, some courts have held that the mere presence of a "sue and be
sued" clause does not constitute a blanket waiver of immunity. In Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Citizens National Bank, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
"sue or be sued" clauses could be "expressly qualified" so that the tribe retains
immunity for certain causes of action.8 This would effectively bar plaintiffs
from bringing suits when the cause of action fits into a protected category.87
Courts may also require plaintiffs to show that certain procedural conditions
have been met before waiver may be effective.88 The Fifth Circuit also noted
that any ambiguities in a "sue and be sued" clause should be generously
construed in the tribe's favor. 89
2. Arbitration Agreements
Contractual arbitration agreements between tribal and nontribal corporations
may also constitute a waiver of immunity, and thus submit a tribal corporation
to judicial process. 90 Arbitration clauses generally require that parties resolve
disputes through arbitration ?roceedings; federal or state courts will then
enforce the resulting awards. Courts addressing this issue have adhered to
the guidelines set forth in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, which require a
85. See Kunesh, supra note 4, at 413-14.
86. Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1966). The court ruled
that the "sue or be sued" clause expressly excluded "the levy of any judgment, lien, or
attachment" upon tribal property. Id Additionally, because the court found the garnishment
action analogous to attachment, it held that the tribe's immunity barred suit. Id. at 521-22.
87. See id at 521-22.
88. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Golf Club, Inc., 104 P.3d 548, 551-52 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004)
(recognizing that section 17 corporations may impose prerequisites that must be fulfilled before a
"sue and be sued" clause within the corporate charter becomes effective).
89. Md. Cas. Co., 361 F.2d at 521. This method of construction was developed to protect
Indians and to compensate for language and literacy barriers present in early tribal dealings with
whites. See CANBY, supra note 24, at 122 (noting that the Supreme Court "fashioned rules of
construction sympathetic to Indian interests" to help the United States carry out its role as a
trustee); COHEN, supra note 5, at 37-38 ("A cardinal rule in the interpretation of Indian treaties is
that ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indians."). Courts have continued to utilize this canon
of construction. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (extending this rule of
interpretation to nontreaty agreements between tribes and the United States); Merritt Schnipper,
Federal Indian Law-Ambiguous Abrogation: The First Circuit Strips Narragansett Indian Tribe
of Its Sovereign Immunity, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 243, 262-64 (2009) (providing an overview
of the development and continued use of the doctrine).
90. See Jeremy Clinefelter, Note, Just Say the "Magic Words": Advocating an Arbitration
Clause Should Be Held to an Express Waiver Standard for the Doctrine of Indian Sovereign
Immunity-C&L Enterprises v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 25 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
315, 337-39 (2001) (arguing that narrowly drawn arbitration clauses that identify the tribe's
waiver, include a forum-selection clause, and submit to adjudication should be regarded as
express waivers). Tribes will more likely accept arbitration clauses in contracts with nontribal
corporations, rather than express waivers of sovereign immunity. See Barton, supra note 9, at 1.
91. Barton, supra note 9, at 1. Additionally, arbitration clauses may contain a choice of law
provision. See, e.g., C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532
U.S. 41 1,415 (2001).
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clear and unequivocal expression of intent for an arbitration clause to waive
immunity. 92 Application of this standard, however, caused a split in case law
that the Supreme Court ultimately resolved.93
In Pan American Co. v. Sycuan Band of Mission Indians, Pan American
attempted to sue the tribe, and asserted that the tribe explicitly waived
sovereign immunity through an arbitration clause included in the contract
because "a submission to arbitration is a submission to judicial
jurisdiction . . . as a matter of definition." 94 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with
this interpretation, finding it contrary to "the strong presumption against tribal
waivers of immunity," and counter to accepted principles of
arbitration-contract interpretation.95
In contrast, other courts have determined that arbitration clauses waive
sovereign immunity. 96  In Sokaogon Gaming Enterprise Corp. v. Tushie-
Montgomery Associates, Inc., the Seventh Circuit upheld a judicially
enforceable award against the tribe, reasoning that the tribe had waived
immunity through the arbitration clause. 97 The court found no ambiguity in the
contract provisions and rejected any suggestion that an effective execution of
waiver required the words "sovereign immunity." 98  Similarly, the court in
Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors found that the arbitration clause
"would be meaningless if it did not constitute a waiver of whatever immunity
[the tribe] possessed."9 9
92. 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978).
93. See C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 417-18.
94. 884 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled in part
by C & L Enters., 532 U.S. at 411. The arbitration clause in the agreement stated that "[i]n the
event a dispute arises between its parties ... either party may seek arbitration of said dispute and
both parties do hereby subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the American Arbitration
Association and do agree to be bound by and comply with its rules and regulations." Id.
95. Id. The plaintiff argued that if the court did not find an implied waiver through the
arbitration clause, then it would be left without judicial remedies and the provision would "merely
be a trap for the unsuspecting." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court rejected this
argument and refused to find an implied waiver of tribal immunity, noting that "[c]onsent by
implication, whatever its justification, still offends the clear mandate of Santa Clara Pueblo." Id
96. See, e.g., Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Montgomery Assocs., Inc., 86 F.3d
656, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1996); Native Village of Eyak v. GC Contractors, 658 P.2d 756, 761
(Alaska 1983); Val/Del, Inc. v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 502, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
97. 86 F.3d at 659. The arbitration clause provided that "claims, disputes, or other matters"
between the parties would be "subject to and decided by arbitration" and "specifically enforceable
in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction." Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
98. Id. at 660 ("The arbitration clause could not be much clearer."). The court analogized to
state and federal waivers of immunity, noting that "the Federal Tort Claims Act or Tucker
Act ... do not say they are waiving 'sovereign immunity'; [but merely] create a right to sue." Id.
99. 658 P.2d at 760-61; see also Va/Del, Inc., 703 P.2d at 508-09 (affirming the court's
reasoning in Eyak and noting that before entering into the contract, the tribe remained free from
liability; however, the tribe expressly waived its immunity when it agreed to the contract and the
arbitration provisions therein).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari in C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma to resolve the conflicting
decisions.100 The Court unanimously held that the arbitration clause and
choice-of-law provision constituted an express waiver and a commitment to
engage in dispute resolution proceedings. 01 Adhering to the principles set
forth in Sokaogon, the Court found that the contract mandated arbitration for
dispute resolution, an arbitration decision bound parties, and any ensuing
arbitral award could be enforced in any court of law having jurisdiction.10
Thus, the Court had the "requisite clarity" necessary to abrogate tribal
immunity.' 03
3. Automatic Waiver of Tribal Immunity for Section 17 Corporations: Two
Approaches
a. Recognition of an Automatic Waiver
Courts have provided relatively limited jurisprudence regarding automatic
waiver as a condition for section 17 incorporation.' 04 In Investment Finance
Management Co. v. Schmit Industries, Inc., the district court simply stated that
"[s]ection 17 corporations waive sovereign immunity," without providing
further elaboration. 1o The court in GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe ofNebraska,
relied on the Investment Finance language, but did not expound on its
reasoning, and ultimately decided the case based on section 16 of the IRA,
instead of section 1 7 .106
100. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411,
418 (2001).
101. Id. at 422-23 (citing Val/Del. Inc., 703 P.2d at 509).
102. Id at 418-19. The terms of the arbitration clause provided that claims between the
parties "shall be decided by arbitration ... unless the parties mutually agree otherwise .... The
award rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered upon it
in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction thereof." Id. at 415 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. at 418.
104. See generally Ann K. Wooster, Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act,
28 A.L.R. FED. 2D 563, 611-13 (2008).
105. No. C86-4234, 1991 WL 635929, at *5 (N.D. Iowa July 3, 1991). Determining that the
tribal corporation had entered into the contract in its section 17 corporate capacity, and not its
section 16 governmental capacity, the court concluded that it had waived its sovereign immunity.
Id Notably, the court separated this finding from any potential waiver discussion concerning the
"sue and be sued" clause in the tribe's corporate charter. Id. at *6. The court analyzed these
issues as two separate and distinct methods of waiving immunity. Id
106. 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (N.D. Iowa 1994). The court pointed out that the Investment
Finance opinion actually cited to and relied on Maryland Casualty Co. Id While this appears to
add additional support, Maryland Casualty Co. stands for the proposition that ambiguities in
contracts should be construed to favor the tribe; a holding reached after the court's discussion of
automatic waiver under section 17. Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th
Cir. 1966). Ultimately, the apparent holding of Investment Finance Management did not become
determinative in GNS because the GNS court found that the tribe entered into the agreement as a
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b. Rejection of an Automatic Waiver
Although the line of cases eschewing an automatic waiver provide slightly
more developed analysis, the jurisprudence is still limited. 0 7 For instance, in
Parker Drilling, the court clarified that when assessing the effect of a "sue and
be sued" clause, "the mere fact of corporate activity or existence does not
[necessarily] waive ... sovereign immunity"; although, section 17 does permit
waiver by the corporation. 08
The Ninth Circuit similarly rejected the concept of an automatic waiver.109
However, the Ninth Circuit did recognize the historical significance of waiver
and incorporation, and the IRA's fundamental goals of economic independence
and business development."10
II. MEMPHIS BIOFUELS: A NOVEL ARGUMENT AND A DEFERENTIAL HOLDING
A. Background Facts in Memphis Biofuels
Memphis Biofuels (Memphis), a biodiesel refining company, primarily does
business in Memphis, Tennessee.I1' Chickasaw Nation Industries, Inc.
(Chickasaw) is a federally chartered corporation that incorporated under the
Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act,ll2 which extends the application of the IRA to
Oklahoma tribes.113  Memphis and Chickasaw sought to enter into a
contractual relationship whereby Chickasaw would transport soybean oil and
diesel to Memphis's plant for biodiesel refinement. 114
As contract negotiations progressed, Memphis-conscious of Chickasaw's
sovereign immunity-sought to protect itself through contractual provisions
that expressly waived any claims of sovereign immunity. 15  Chickasaw
responded by sending Memphis a draft of the contract that had been edited by
Chickasaw's in-house counsel." 6  The draft indicated that board approval
section 16 entity, thereby obviating any need for further analysis of automatic waiver. GNS, 866
F. Supp. at 1189.
107. See Wooster, supra note 104, at 611-13.
108. Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1136-37 (D. Alaska
1978) (emphasis added).
109. Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).
110. Id. at 1098-99. But, the court also made a point of noting that concepts of immunity
and incorporation are not inextricably linked, such that one necessitates the other. Id. at 1099.
Furthermore, the court explained that merely electing to incorporate does not waive sovereign
immunity, just as choosing to waive immunity does not create a de facto corporation. Id.
111. Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 918 (6th Cir.
2009).
112. Id; see 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (2006).
113. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 918; see RUSco, supra note 56, at ix.
114. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 918.
115. Id (noting that the provisions included a "'representation and warranty' that
[Chickasaw's] waiver was valid, enforceable, and effective").
116. Id at 918.
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would be necessary to approve a waiver of sovereign immunity." 7
Additionally, Chickasaw's corporate charter contained a limited "sue and be
sued clause," which also required board approval.' 8 Despite the requirements
mandated by the charter, Chickasaw entered into the contract without the
approval of the waiver provision by the Chickasaw board of directors. 1 9
Chickasaw later renounced the agreement.120
When mediation attempts proved unsuccessful,121 Memphis filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee, seeking a declaratory judgment that would pronounce Chickasaw's
sovereign-immunity waiver effective.122 Chickasaw responded with a motion
to dismiss.123 At trial, the district court found a lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and granted Chickasaw's motion to dismiss, which Memphis
subsequently appealed.124
B. The Sixth Circuit Rejects the Claim ofAutomatic Waiver Resulting from
Section 17 Incorporation
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Memphis raised three arguments to
demonstrate that Chickasaw had waived its tribal immunity, thus subjecting
itself to the court's jurisdiction.125 First, Memphis argued that Chickasaw had
expressly waived its tribal sovereign immunity.126  Second, it argued that
equitable doctrines should apply to waive tribal sovereign immunity.127
Finally, Memphis argued that incorporation under section 17 automatically
waived tribal sovereign immunity.128
117. Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., No. 08-2253, slip op. at 4
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 12, 2008) (discussing two comments provided in the draft that expressly
reiterated the need for board approval before the corporation could effectively agree to waive
immunity).
118. Id. at 17-18.
119. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 919.
120. Id
121. Id The parties initially entered into mediation proceedings as mandated by the contract,
but when it became clear that the parties could not reach a resolution, Memphis filed a request for
arbitration. Id. Refusing to commence arbitration, Chickasaw filed a suit in the Chickasaw
Nation District Court. Id. The tribal corporation sought both a declaratory judgment that would
find the waiver of immunity invalid because the board had failed to approve the position, as well
as an injunction to halt the arbitration proceedings. Id.
122. Id Memphis also sought to compel arbitration and to get a temporary restraining order
to stop Chickasaw from pursuing its case in the Chickasaw Nation District Court. Id
123. Id
124. Id. The court found that due to Chickasaw's sovereign immunity, no diversity
jurisdiction existed; moreover, Memphis had failed to raise properly a federal question, which
prevented the court from exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id.
125. Id. at 922.
126. Id at 920-21.
127. Id. at 922.
128. Id at 920.
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1. Lack ofExpress Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Memphis first argued that the "sue and be sued" clause contained in
Chickasaw's corporate charter constituted an express waiver.19 The court
rejected this argument because it determined that Chickasaw's charter did not
contain a broad enough "sue and be sued" clause to waive the corporation's
immunity.130 Instead, the clause contained an express limitation to the
waiver-the requirement of board approval. 3 l Similarly, the "sue and be
sued" clause in the Chickasaw-Memphis contract required board approval,
which Chickasaw never obtained.132 Although the parties had signed a waiver
provision, and Memphis believed that Chickasaw had obtained the proper
approval, Chickasaw retained immunity.
2. No Waiver oflmmunity Through Equitable Doctrines
Second, based on the representations Chickasaw officials made when parties
signed the agreement, Memphis argued that equitable doctrines required the
court to find a waiver.134 The court also rejected this argument, relying on
cases holding that "unauthorized acts of tribal officials are insufficient to waive
tribal-sovereign immunity."
1 35
3. Automatic Waiver of Tribal Immunity: An Issue of First Impression for
the Sixth Circuit
Lastly, and most significantly, Memphis argued that incorporation under
section 17 of the IRA created an automatic waiver of sovereign immunity.136
This argument provided the Sixth Circuit with its first opportunity to comment
on the issue of automatic waiver. 37 Recognizing the split in authority on this
issue,138 the court examined the language of section 17, specifically noting the
statute's silence with regard to sovereign immunity. 139 Deferring to Congress,
the Sixth Circuit interpreted the IRA's silence to indicate an absence of waiver
129. Id at 921.
130. Id at 921-22.
131. Id
132. Id at 922.
133. Id (noting that the tribe's charter controlled; therefore, immunity could not be waived
without the board's requisite approval).
134. Id
135. Id.
136. Id. at 920.
137. Id
138. See supra Part 1.D.3. Compare GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe of Neb., 866 F. Supp.
1185, 1188-89 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (recognizing automatic waiver pursuant to section 17
incorporation), with Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th
Cir. 2002) (opining that a tribe choosing to incorporate does not automatically waive its sovereign
immunity).
139. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920.
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of immunity.140 Furthermore, the court pointed to the well-established rule that
waiver must be expressly stated,141 and noted that disparities or ambiguities in
contracts must be liberally construed in the tribe's favor. 142
Taking these findings and considerations into account, the court determined
that section 17 incorporation did not automatically waive sovereign
immunity.143 Instead, the Sixth Circuit found that "the better reading of
Section 17 is that it creates 'arms of the tribe' that do not automatically forfeit
tribal-sovereign immunity." 144 Thus, the court held that an "incorporated
tribe" retains its sovereign immunity unless the contracting parties procured an
express waiver provision.145
Ill. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REJECTED AUTOMATIC WAIVER OF
TRIBAL IMMUNITY FOR SECTION 17 CORPORATIONS
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Memphis Biofuels properly incorporates the
IRA's legislative history, the well-established requirement for express waiver,
and the relevant case law on the matter.' 46 The holding comports with most
jurisprudence on the issue, circumvents the potential negative implications of a
contrary finding, adheres to the canons of construction, and avoids a path that
courts have repeatedly eschewed. 147
A. Appropriate Consideration ofLegislative Intent
Faced with a split in case law regarding automatic waiver of tribal immunity,
the Sixth Circuit properly examined the legislative intent behind the IRA and
determined that Congress intended for the statute to "encourage non-Indian
businesses to engage in commerce with Indian tribes."1 48 Although the court's
statement may too narrowly characterize the IRA's purpose, which aimed more
140. Id at 920-21. The court emphasized that waiver can only be found where Congress has
authorized the action, or where the tribe has abrogated its immunity. Id. (citing Kiowa Tribe of
Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998)).
141. Id. at 921 (citing Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505, 509 (1991)).
142. Id ("[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians . . . with ambiguous
provisions being interpreted to their benefit." (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 759, 766 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. Id at 921.
144. Id Although Memphis argued that Chickasaw was precluded from claiming sovereign
immunity because it was not "'an arm' of the Chickasaw Nation," the court found this contrary to
the language of section 17. Id Additionally, section 17 refers to the corporate entity as an
"incorporated tribe," thereby supporting the court's finding that the tribe's sovereign immunity
shielded Chickasaw. Id.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part II.B.3.
147. See infra Part Ill.
148. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920 (citation omitted); see also 73 CONG. REC. at 11,123
(1934).
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broadly to return Indian tribes to a position of self-governance, 149 the court
nonetheless recognized the IRA's overarching goal of tribal
self-determination. 5 0 Inherently, the IRA seeks to enable each individual tribe
to control its internal affairs and limit federal government intrusion.15  Hence,
inferring automatic waiver would restrict this self-governing power and impose
the will of the government on nonconsenting tribes.152 Moreover, such an
action would violate the IRA's purpose; legislators originally passed the law to
- * 153prevent this very issue.
B. Statutory Silence and a Deferential Finding in the Absence of a Clear
Congressional Mandate
Tribal-sovereign-immunity jurisprudence has consistently recognized that
tribes are amenable to suit only when Congress has provided express statutory
consent. 154 Accordingly, in Memphis Biofuels, when the Sixth Circuit found
section 17 silent on the issue of sovereign immunity, it roperly construed the
silence as Congress's intent to uphold the doctrine. This determination
coincided with prior holdings in cases in which parties sought to establish
*156
waiver.
149. See 73 CONG. REc. at 11,123, 11,125, 11,732; see also RUSCO, supra note 56, at 295
("[T]he IRA embodied the key idea behind the tribal alternative ideology, which was that forced
assimilation should be replaced by measures giving Indians the right to make uncoerced choices
in these matters.").
150. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
73-1804, at 6 (1934) (recognizing that section 17's purpose was to rehabilitate tribal economies,
damaged by years of oppression); Am. Vantage Cos. v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 292 F.3d
1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the statute meant to promote tribal economic
progression and foster business); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp.
1127, 1138 (D. Alaska 1978) (noting that section 17 was created to promote competition between
tribal and nontribal companies).
151. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6; S. REP. NO. 73-1080, at 1-2 (1934); 78 CONG. REC.
11,123, 11,125, 11,732; see also RUSCO, supra note 56, at 115-16. Senator Wheeler told the
Senate that the bill lacked any language permitting the government "to impose its will upon the
Indians on any reservation." 78 CONG. REC. 11,123.
152. See 78 CONG. REC. 11,123 (emphasizing the importance of tribal control over both
economic and non-economic affairs). Congress eliminated compulsory provisions from earlier
drafts of the bill to ensure that a majority of tribe members, and not the federal government,
would be making decisions about the tribe's organization. Id.
153. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6.
154. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978); United States v.
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Am. Indian Agric. Credit Consortium, Inc. v.
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (8th Cir. 1985); Md. Cas. Co. v. Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 520 (5th Cir. 1966).
155. See Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 920-21
(6th Cir. 2009).
156. See supra Part I.B.
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The Sixth Circuit rejected Memphis's request to find an implied waiver,
which the Supreme Court had similarly declined to do in Santa Clara
Pueblo.iss Although the statutory language provided no basis for a waiver,
Memphis wanted the court to read beyond the language of the statute by
finding that mere incorporation provided such a justification.159 The court
decided that permitting such an inference would require the court to overstep
its judicial authority; thus, the Sixth Circuit chose the prudent course and
rejected the argument. 160
C. The Weight of Case Law Points to Rejection of an Automatic Waiver
Although the Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that some courts have held
section 17 incorporation waives immunity,161 this line of jurisprudence is
limited and tenuous at best.162 In recognizing the split on this issue, the court
cited to GNS for the proposition that section 17 incorporation automatically
waives immunity.163 An examination of GNS, however, illustrates that this
was not GNS's holding, but merely dicta by the court.164 Indeed, the GNS
court cited to a slip opinion for this proposition; however, neither the GNS
court, nor the slip opinion explained or supported its reasoning for finding that
section 17 incorporation created a waiver of immunity.165
Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit rejected Memphis's assertion that Chickasaw
was not an arm of the tribe as a result of its corporate status.166 Instead, it
classified Chickasaw as an arm of the tribal nation, which did not waive
167immunity simply by incorporating under section 17. The court's holding
157. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 921.
158. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58-59 (internal citations omitted).
159. See Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920.
160. Id at 921 ("Because the language of Section 17 does not explicitly waive sovereign
immunity, we conclude that it should not be interpreted to do so impliedly.").
161. Id. at 920.
162. See supra Part I.D.3.a.
163. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920 (quoting GNS, Inc. v. Winnebgo Tribe of Neb., 866
F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (N.D. Iowa 1994)).
164. See GNS, 866 F. Supp. at 1189. The court held that because the entity at issue acted as a
section 16 governmental entity, and not a section 17 corporation, the issue of automatic waiver
did not apply. Id. Further, finding a lack of unequivocal consent to suit, the court determined
that the tribe had retained its full sovereign immunity. Id.
165. Id (citing Inv. Fin. Mgmt. Co. v. Schmit Indus., Inc., No. C86-4234, 1991 WL 635929,
at *5 (N.D. Iowa July 3, 1991)). The signal directing the reader's attention to Maryland Casualty
Co. misleads the reader; Maryland Casualty Co. only serves as authority for the earlier portion of
the same sentence, which acknowledged that contractual ambiguities should be resolved in the
tribe's favor. See supra note 106.
166. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 921.
167. Id Courts have held that an "arm of the tribe" is an entity so closely linked to the tribe
that its activity is attributed to the tribe. See, e.g., Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F. 3d 1044,
1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (postulating that the definition of an arm of the tribe rests upon whether the
tribe's activities are "properly deemed to be those of the tribe"); Gristede's Foods, Inc. v.
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demonstrates that a section 17 corporation retains tribal sovereign immunity
because of the close relationship between the tribe and corporation.
D. The Unclear Scope ofan "Automatic Waiver"
Memphis also argued for an "automatic wavier" of tribal immunity, but did
not clarify or define what this would entail.169 Presumably, such a waiver
would create a blanket waiver of immunity for all tribes incorporated under
section 17-a statutory interpretation the Memphis Biofuels court judged
improper. 170  Scholars have criticized a broad waiver as unwise, and have
instead advocated a narrow or limited waiver. 171 A broad construction would
eliminate a tribe's power to self-govem, thus directly conflicting with the
IRA's goal. 17 2
More significantly, the presence of an express-waiver clause, albeit a
qualified one, seems to negate the argument for an automatic waiver.173
Hence, Memphis's argument that all section 17 corporations should be
vulnerable to suit simply based on the organization method fails to recognize
that section 17 corporations often craft nuanced provisions in which they
consent to suit themselves.1 74  Perhaps where no waiver clause exists,
Unkechuage Nation, 660 F. Supp. 2d 442, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining that an arm of the
tribe operates "as an extension of the tribe's own economic activity"). As such, it remains fully
protected by the tribe's sovereign immunity. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian
Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st Cir. 2000). A tribe's motivation for establishing
an organization, be it governmental or commercial, does not affect the organization's retention of
immunity. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 (1998); White
Mountain Apache Indian Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654, 657 (Ariz. 1971) (citing Md. Cas. Co. v.
Citizen's Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir. 1966)).
168. See supra note 167.
169. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 920 (failing to elaborate on the parameters of an
automatic waiver). Memphis argued that federally chartered corporations should not be entitled
to immunity because tribal entities incorporated under tribal or state law do not automatically
enjoy such immunity. Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d 917 (No.
08-6145). Asserting that Chickasaw constituted a separate and distinct entity from the tribal
nation, Memphis maintained that Chickasaw was not entitled to the tribe's immunity. See id. at
8-9. Memphis also urged the court to consider federally incorporated tribal corporations'
"creation of [a] statute," and argued that nothing in section 17 indicated immunity so it could not
exist. Id
170. Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 921.
171. See Fogleman, supra note 69, at 1370 (arguing that waiver under section 17 would "go
farther than required in sacrificing immunity); see also Kunesh, supra note 4, at 407 (discussing
express waivers of immunity and noting that the terms of "immunity waivers should be drafted on
a case-by-case basis and tailored to the particular transaction").
172. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
173. See Fogleman, supra note 69, at 1361-62 (noting that tribal corporations already have
incentives to enact a partial waiver in order to ease the fears of contracting parties and to ensure
fairness).
174. See Padraic I. McCoy, Sovereign Immunity and Tribal Commercial Activity: A Legal
Summary and Policy Check, 57 FED. LAw. 41, 43 (2010). The author explains:
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Memphis's argument would carry more merit; 175 in this case, however, the
language of the charter presented a clear obstacle and Memphis's argument
176
appears nothing more than a desperate attempt at recovery.1
E. A Contrary Holding in Memphis Biofuels Would Discourage Incorporation
Under Section 17
The IRA incentivizes tribes to incorporate under section 17 so they may
increase their business transactions with nontribal entities.' 77 By encouraging
tribes to waive aspects of liability instead of claiming complete sovereignty,
the statute intended to protect nontribal parties, which would otherwise be
dealing with a completely immune tribal party. 178
If the Sixth Circuit had taken a contrary position in Memphis Biofuels and
found that section 17 incorporation waived full tribal immunity, tribal entities
would be discouraged from incorporating under the statute.' 7  Tribes might
instead choose to incorporate under tribal or state corporate law.'so
Like other governments, tribes waive their sovereign immunity, and they do so with
increasing frequency. Although no overarching statute imposes the requirement, many
tribal leaders and advisers have concluded that tribes are effectively barred from
entering into large construction contracts or from financing agreements, for example,
without immunity waivers that allow an aggrieved party access to a court or arbitration.
The size, scope, and application of the waiver; the forum permitted to adjudicate a
dispute; and the substantive law governing the matter-all of these are subject to
negotiation between the parties. For tort matters, nothing prevents an injured party
from petitioning a tribe for a limited waiver after the fact in order to allow the party
some avenue of recourse-similar to the writ of petition under English law.
Id. In Memphis Biofuels, Memphis imposed its own waiver provision, which, although accepted
by Chickasaw, explicitly required the Chickasaw's board approval. Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v.
Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2009). The board never granted
approval, however, so the waiver never became effective. Id. at 922.
175. But see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1978) (holding that even
when a statute does not address waiver, tribal immunity is nonetheless maintained); Parker
Drilling, Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Cmty., 451 F. Supp. 1127, 1136 (D. Alaska 1978) (finding that
mere corporate existence did not waive sovereign immunity).
176. See Memphis Biofuels, 585 F.3d at 922. The court rejected Memphis's assertion that an
express waiver existed because the Chickasaw board of directors had not approved the waiver
provision as required by the contract, and because the corporate charter's "sue and be sued"
clause only applied to approved legal action. Id
177. See Dao Lee Bernardi-Boyle, State Corporations for Indian Reservations, 26 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 41, 49 (2001).
178. See id
179. See infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
1 80. See Gregory J. Wong, Intent Matters: Assessing Sovereign Immunity for Tribal Entities,
82 WASH. L. REV. 205, 219 (2007) ("Tribes have the power to incorporate their agencies and
corporations under federal, state, or tribal law.").
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Under state law, however, tribes do not maintain their immunity. So,
theoretically, if sovereign immunity would be waived regardless of the tribe's
incorporation method, a tribe might actively attempt to make itself vulnerable
to suit in state court to demonstrate its intent to fulfill its contract and hopefully
attract more business.182 Tribes could additionally choose to incorporate under
tribal law in an effort to maintain immunity.183  Although not guaranteed,184
many corporations organized under tribal law retain their immunity if they
establish an interconnected relationship with the tribe. 185 Because of the
flexible structure, tribally incorporated businesses can create their own rules,
and establish limited waivers to protect assets from suit while remaining
commercially competitive.186
The distinguishing aspect between the various methods of incorporation is
that section 17 alone allows corporations to automatically retain tribal
sovereign immunity. If the Sixth Circuit had held that section 17 does not
actually provide this shield of immunity, tribal corporations would lack
incentive to incorporate under the statute.
181. See Bernardi-Boyle, supra note 177, at 58 (explaining that because state corporate laws
subject a corporation to suit in the state of incorporation, for-profit tribal corporations organized
under state law waive their sovereign immunity); Heidi McNeil Staudenmaier & Metchi
Palaniappan, The Intersection of Corporate America and Indian Country: Negotiating Successful
Business Alliances, 22 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 569, 598 (2005); see also, ATKINSON & NILLES,
supra note 3, at IV-4 ("[O]rganization under state law may be fatal to a finding of entity-level
sovereign immunity.").
182. See Bernardi-Boyle, supra note 177, at 42.
183. See ATKINSON & NILLES, supra note 3, at 111-1 to 111-9 (providing an overview of the
tribal incorporation process). Incorporation under tribal law is generally easier than incorporation
under section 17. Id. at Ill-1.
184. Id. at 111-4.
185. Id. (explaining that courts conduct a fact-specific inquiry to determine if corporations
organized pursuant to tribal law retain sovereign immunity). Courts generally consider whether a
close link exists between the tribe and tribal corporation with regard to structure and various
characteristics, and whether federal policies of tribal self-determination are promoted by cloaking
the tribal corporation with the tribe's immunity. Id
186. See Kunesh, supra note 4, at 408-14 (discussing the various ways to waive sovereign
immunity under tribal law). When surveyed, one tribal leader stated, "the best way to convince
the outside world that the tribe will be held accountable is to publicize the fact that the tribe
regulates itself. Investors will not fear tribal immunity if they believe that the tribal courts
themselves will fairly adjudicate potential claims . . . ." Bemardi-Boyle, supra note 177, at 60-
61.
187. See Smith, supra note 41, at 20-21 ("[W]hile section 17 corporations retain their tribal
status-and, accordingly, sovereign immunity in the absence of a 'sue and be sued' waiver-the
other species of corporations are not imbued automatically with such status.").
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F. Broader Questions Properly Left for Another Day
Surely, valid concerns about maintaining tribal sovereign immunity exist.
Concurring in Oklahoma Tax Commission, Justice John Paul Stevens described
tribal immunity as founded upon an "anachronistic fiction." 89 Similarly, the
majority in Kiowa acknowledged "reasons to doubt the wisdom of perpetuating
the doctrine,"' 90 and provided policy arguments suggesting that tribal
immunity has been extended beyond its original purpose of protecting tribal
self-governance from state encroachment.191 Additionally, in C & L
Enterprises, the Supreme Court pointed to "real world objectives," suggesting
that more than just an examination of the waiver's explicitness should be
considered.19 2
The Sixth Circuit recognized the potential judicial movement toward a less
stringent waiver standard,193  but properly "defer[red] to the role of
Congress,"' 94 instead of making any far-reaching changes to the doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's refusal to recognize incorporation under section 17 of the
IRA as an automatic waiver of a tribe's sovereign immunity was an
188. See Florey, supra note 14, at 640-44 (detailing the undesirable effects of sovereign
immunity, emphasizing the lack of incentive for tribes to avoid negligent behavior, and discussing
the injustice of tort victims who can not obtain a complete remedy).
189. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
512 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring). Although Justice Stevens recognized the entrenched view
supporting tribal immunity, he believed that all governments should be liable for their illegal
actions. Id
190. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998). The Court
declared that the independence and mobility of society diminishes the need to protect "nascent
tribal governments from encroachments by States." Id.
191. Id. The Kiowa court also expressed concern that immunity could harm people, such as
tort victims, who become involuntarily involved with tribal corporations. Id; see also Recent
Case, supra note 12, at 561 (stating that the IRA may fail to provide full remedies to injured
parties, and suggesting that legislative action should be taken to require tribal corporations to
retain a certain amount of assets or business liability insurance to ensure future plaintiffs are
protected).
192. C & L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411,
422 (2001). Similarly, in a Seventh Circuit case, Judge Richard A. Posner questioned the
requisite explicitness of waiver. Sokaogon Gaming Enter. Corp. v. Tushie-Mongtomery Assocs.,
Inc., 86 F.3d 656, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1996). He asserted that the purpose of a clear waiver
statement led him to "doubt whether there really is a requirement that a tribe's waiver of its
sovereign immunity be explicit, especially since the harder it is for a tribe to waive its sovereign
immunity the harder it is for it to make advantageous business transactions." Id Posner also
argued that an arbitration clause could constitute implicit waiver only if the words "sovereign
immunity" were needed to make the waiver explicit. Id. at 660. He noted, however, that using
these specific words had never been required. Id.
193. Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc., 585 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir.
2009).
194. Id. (quoting Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758).
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appropriate holding in several respects.' 95  Congress' silence regarding
automatic waiver in section 17 provides a strong indication of its intent to
preserve tribal sovereign immunity. If the Sixth Circuit had found that
automatic waiver existed despite congressional silence, it would have
embraced an implied waiver-a result that courts have repeatedly rejected.196
More importantly, such a holding would allow the judiciary to intrude on the
legislature's territory. 197  Authority rejecting an automatic waiver far
outweighs the relatively weak jurisprudence supporting such a waiver.198 The
negative implications of a contrary finding would not only nullify more than
seventy years of case law, but would also undermine the purpose of the IRA.199
Although valid reasons to abandon or limit sovereign immunity may exist, any
effort to do so is best left to Congress, and not the judiciary. 200
195. See supra Part Ill.
196. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part I.D.3.
199. See supra Part Ill.
200. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (stating that
although it had concerns in upholding tribal sovereign immunity, the Court would "defer to the
role Congress may wish to exercise in this important judgment").
1199
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